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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARTY JOE GAL VAN, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Case No. 20050005 
(incarcerated) 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from third degree felony and class A misdemeanor convictions entered in a court of 
record. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Does the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement require resentencing before 
a new judge? 
This issue was raised in the trial court (R. 84-1114, R. 146 at 26). 
This Court will be addressing this issue as a matter of law, without deference to 
the trial court. See, e ^ , State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-76 (Utah 1988) 
(remanding to the trial court to assess whether prosecutor's promise in plea bargain was 
illusory and required withdrawal of the plea without any apparent deference to the trial 
court). 
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to rule on the 22(e) motion? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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This issue was raised in the trial court (R. 140). 
Jurisdictional issues pose questions of law, to be addressed without deference to 
the trial court. See, e ^ , Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^  10, 44 P.3d 724. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions and rules are copied in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mr. Galvan with one count of second degree felony robbery and 
one count of third degree felony attempted theft (R. 2-3). Michael A. Peterson of LDA 
represented Galvan (R. 42). Galvan waived his preliminary hearing (R. 47). 
The State filed an amended information charging Galvan with third degree felony 
theft and class a misdemeanor assault (R. 53-54). Galvan entered no contest pleas to the 
amended charges on the condition detailed in the written plea form as follows: 
At sentencing, the state recommends jail time on the Class A with 
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the 
end of successful probation, the state does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction. 
(R. 56-62). At the plea hearing, counsel clarified: 
Mr. Sheffield [the prosecutor] will also recommend at the time of 
sentencing probation in this case, with some jail time, and a release to an 
intensive inpatient program. 
(R. 146 at 11). 
Judge Kennedy sentenced Galvan to consecutive terms of zero to five years in 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prison and one year in jail (R. 68-70). 
Counsel moved for a restitution hearing and filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 71, 
76). 
Present counsel was appointed to represent Galvan (R. 78). 
Galvan moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) because 
the prosecutor had breached the plea agreement (R. 84-114). 
Prior to the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate, Galvan wrote to Judge 
Kennedy asking him to recuse himself for various reasons, including his failure to 
intervene when the victim of the assault was threatening Galvan at sentencing (R. 124). 
At the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate, present counsel asked Judge 
Kennedy to continue the matter until a transcript of the prior proceedings in the case 
could be prepared and reviewed (R. 125). The court agreed and continued the hearing (R. 
125). 
That same day, the court held a conference call with counsel for both parties and 
struck the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate (R. 127). The final order 
regarding the conference call reflects that after setting the hearing, the court realized that 
LDA had filed a notice of appeal (R. 140). The court was concerned that this deprived 
him of jurisdiction (R. 140). Counsel for both parties stated their beliefs that the court did 
have jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 22(e) motion to vacate, and offered to research the 
matter for the court (R. 140). The court ruled that he did not have jurisdiction over the 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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22(e) motion, and would defer ruling on the restitution motion, despite having jurisdiction 
to address it while the matter was on appeal (R. 140). 
Judge Henriod signed the final order (R. 140), and counsel filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 142). 
Galvan moved this Court to consolidate his two appeals, and this Court granted the 
motion (R. 144). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Galvan entered no contest pleas to the amended charges on the condition detailed 
in the written plea form as follows: 
At sentencing, the state recommends jail time on the Class A with 
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the 
end of successful probation, the state does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction. 
(R. 56-62). At the plea hearing, counsel clarified: 
Mr. Sheffield [the prosecutor] will also recommend at the time of 
sentencing probation in this case, with some jail time, and a release to an 
intensive inpatient program. 
(R. 146 at 11). 
At sentencing, after trial counsel identified the in-patient treatment facilities 
willing to accept Mr. Galvan, and after the victim spoke, the prosecutor, Paul Parker, 
stated: 
I just noticed from the pre-sentence report, your Honor, some things that are 
troubling. First of all, of course, is his history. It is long and extensive, and 
it is very troubling for violence, the type of things that the defendant says 
today, that it was just, you know, related to the alcohol. 
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But yet it is replete back from the early days in the mid 1980s - or, 
1982, with assaulting type offenses, and it runs the gamut up to the felony, 
which was an aggravated assault, apparently with a weapon. He has just 
done this almost all of his adult life, and this is - this is very concerning, 
particularly given the facts and the circumstances we have in this case. 
Secondly, I am concerned with his ability to really do well on a 
probation setting. I notice on the page that describes the probation history 
he has not done well. He has had some difficulties. He has not complied, 
and they've had to bring him back. I notice even under the criminal history, 
where it talks about the jail disciplinaries, that he was remanded for 
inciting, agitating other prisoners, using threatening and abusive language. 
Again, these are not wonderful indications of an individual that 
should be on probation, and it looks to me like he needs to be in prison, as 
the pre-sentence report has indicated. We'll submit it, your Honor. 
(R. 146 at 23-24). 
After Mr. Galvan pled for leniency with the court, trial counsel for Galvan 
approached for an unrecorded bench conference (R. 146 at 26). Following this, trial 
counsel noted that the prosecutor, Paul Parker, had breached the plea agreement reached 
between trial counsel and another prosecutor, Kelly Sheffield, after Mr. Sheffield had 
failed to leave a note for Mr. Parker informing him of the plea agreement (R. 146 at 26). 
Mr. Parker interjected to explain that the plea agreement was not in his file, and 
that "to stable that agreement," he would withdraw his comments and "make an 
affirmative recommendation of probation." (R. 146 at 27). 
The court indicated that regardless of the recommendations and regardless of what 
the victim said, on the basis of Mr. Galvan's history involving prior abusive conduct, the 
court would sentence him to consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison and one year 
in jail (R. 146 at 28). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement entitles Mr. Galvan to specific 
performance of the plea agreement in front of a new sentencing judge. 
The trial court had jurisdiction to so rule, despite the filing of the first notice of 
appeal. 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court, with an order that the case 
be re-assigned for resentencing in compliance with the plea agreement. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
MR. GALVAN IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN. 
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court recognized that when a 
guilty plea rests to a material degree upon the promise of a prosecutor, due process 
requires that the prosecutor fulfill his or her promise. See id. at 262.l The Court left to 
the discretion of the state courts the decision of whether a prosecutor's breach of a plea 
agreement should result in the withdrawal of the plea or specific performance of the 
promised recommendation in a resentencing before a different judge. Id. at 263. 
Utah law has long recognized that when a defendant misunderstands the value of 
the inducement which leads him to enter his guilty plea, this renders the benefit of the 
*Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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plea bargain illusory and entitles him to withdraw his plea. See, e.g., State v. Cope land, 
765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 (Utah 1988) (court remanded to determine whether guilty pleas 
were induced by sentencing recommendation that was legally impossible to come to 
fruition, because if defendant misunderstood the value or the recommendation which 
induced him to enter the pleas, the illusory nature of the prosecutor's promise justified 
withdrawal of the plea). 
As a matter of policy, most courts require prosecutors to comply with both the 
letter and spirit of their agreements, because integrity should be expected of the 
prosecution in all circumstances, and reliability of the prosecution is essential to the 
continuing functioning of the very important plea bargaining process. See, e.g., United 
States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, these courts require the 
prosecutors to comply with both the letter and spirit of their agreements, and will find a 
breach of agreements when prosecutors technically comply with their obligations while 
making "thinly veiled" or very subtle efforts to persuade a court in a fashion inconsistent 
with the prosecutors' obligations under the agreements. See id. at 1211-1213. 
The lengthy prison recommendation delivered by Mr. Parker in this case, followed 
by his perfunctory attempt to comply with the letter of the plea agreement, was no 
substitute for delivering the true inducement which led Mr. Galvan to enter his plea, and 
entitles him to withdraw his plea. Cf. Copeland, supra. 
Because the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement nullified the inducement 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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which led Galvan to enter the pleas and rendered Galvan's guilty pleas unknowing and 
involuntary, this Court should remand this matter to a different sentencing judge so that 
Galvan can receive the benefit of the plea bargain. See Santobello, supra. 
This Court discussed Santobello and Brye and other pertinent authorities in this 
area of the law, in the recent decision, State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203. 
In SmiU the prosecutor agreed at the time of the plea agreement not to recommend 
any jail time, but at the time of sentencing, recommended a jail sentence of three to six 
months. Id. at ^ j 3 and 4. On appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to 
withdraw the plea, the Court first reviewed Santobello, and then surveyed Utah decisions 
and decisions from other jurisdictions, which likewise grant trial courts discretion to 
remedy prosecutorial breaches of plea agreements with withdrawal of pleas or specific 
performance. Id. atfflf 10-17. 
In SmiU the defendant did not seek specific performance in a resentencing before a 
different judge, one of the two remedies authorized by Santobello. See Smit at f 35 
(concurring opinion of Judge Thorne). Rather, he immediate sought specific performance 
in the sentencing before the original judge who heard the prosecutor's initial unlawful 
recommendation of a jail sentence. Id. When the prosecutor complied with the 
defendant's demand by correcting the recommendation to comport with the plea 
agreement and the judge imposed jail time, the defendant then moved to withdraw the 
plea, and the trial court denied this motion, concluding that the sentencing decision was 
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not influenced by the prosecutor's first unlawful recommendation, which was cured by 
the prosecutor's corrected recommendation. See id. at ^f 35 (concurring opinion of Judge 
Thorne) and 20-21 (main opinion). 
The fact that a judge is not influenced by a prosecutor's illegal recommendation 
does not mollify the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement, which breach destroys the 
knowing and voluntary nature of the entry of guilty pleas. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 
262-63 (remanding for withdrawal of the plea or resentencing before a different judge, 
despite the fact that the judge below found that he was not influenced by the prosecution); 
Srnit, 2004 UT App 222 at ^f 13-15 (discussing Utah cases recognizing that if defendant 
enters guilty plea contingent on the promise of the prosecution which is not or cannot be 
fulfilled, this renders the plea unknowing and involuntary). 
Smit should be read very narrowly and limited to its holding, that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the unique 
facts of that case. For if prosecutors were given carte blanche to make and then retract 
recommendations inconsistent with their obligations under plea agreements, this would 
undermine the integrity of their very important governmental office, and the reliability 
and advisability of utilizing the plea bargaining process. Cf., e.g., Brye, supra. It would 
also undermine the value of the plea bargains and negate their validity by rendering the 
inducements illusory. Cf, e.g., Copeland, supra. 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court and order that Mr. Galvan 
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be resentenced before a new sentencing court. See Santobello, supra. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO RULE ON THE 22(e) MOTION. 
The trial court was in error in ruling that he had no jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 
22(e) motion by virtue of the filing of the notice of appeal. Under the plain terms of Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e), a trial court "may correct... a sentence imposed in an illegal manner ... 
at any time." Cf. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991) (trial courts are 
viewed as having continuing jurisdiction to correct void sentences). 
Thus, the general rule that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of 
jurisdiction does not apply in this context. Cf State v. Sampson, 806 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 
App. 1991) (because rule and statute pertaining to certificates of probable cause specifies 
that petitions for certificates are to be filed with the trial courts, the general rule that the 
filing of the notice of appeal divests a trial court of jurisdiction does not apply). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand this to the trial court for resentencing in compliance 
with the plea agreement before a new judge. 
Respectfully submitted on June 6, 2005. 
Elizabeth? 
Counsel for Mr. Galvan 
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I hereby certify that on June 6, 2005,1 mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. 
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11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a 
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after 
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise 
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter 
bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant 
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence 
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if 
any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the 
defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting 
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a 
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the 
commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 
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at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a 
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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Elizabeth Hunt L.L.C. 
Elizabeth Hunt (5292) 
Attorney for Mr. Galvan 
569 Browning Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801)461-4300 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
EST AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARTY JOE GALVAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER REGARDING 
JURISDICTION 
CaseNo.0041904272FS 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
On January 24, 2005, this matter came on for hearing regarding restitution and Mr. 
Galvan's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Mr, Galvan 
was present with his counsel, Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Kelly R. 
Sheffield. 
Because Mr. Galvan had written a letter to the Court seeking recusal, this Court set 
the matter for further hearing on March 7, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., in order to give Ms. Hunt 
an opportunity to review the record and to file whatever pleadings she felt were in order 
on the recusal issue. 
After the hearing, the Court realized that a notice of appeal had been filed on Mr. 
By« 
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SALT LAKE CPUNTY. 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Galvan's behalf, and the Court's clerk initiated a conference call with counsel for the 
parties because the Court was concerned that the notice of appeal may have deprived the 
Court of jurisdiction. 
During the conference call, Ms. Hunt indicated her belief that the Court did have 
continuing jurisdiction over the restitution matter and the Rule 22 motion to vacate, and 
offered to brief the jurisdictional issue for the Court. Mr. Sheffield indicated his belief 
that the Court did have continuing jurisdiction over the restitution matter, and indicated 
that he would have a clerk research the Court's jurisdiction over the Rule 22 motion to 
vacate. 
The Court concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the Rule 22 
motion, and that, while it does have continuing jurisdiction over the restitution issue, the 
Court would defer hearing the restitution issues until the appeal is complete. 
Accordingly, the hearing of March 7, 2005 is stricken. 
So ordered this ^ } \ day of
 m 
THE HONORABLE JOE^[ m U L 
JUDGE OF THE THIRD 
approved as to fo; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I hereby certify that on January 24,2005,1 mailed, e-mailed and faxed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Kelly R. Sheffield, Deputy District Attorney, 111 East 
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 8, 
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